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NOTES 
WHO’S FEELING LUCKY?  
SKEWED INCENTIVES, LACK OF 
TRANSPARENCY, AND MANIPULATION  
OF GOOGLE SEARCH RESULTS  
UNDER THE DMCA 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In March of 2002 Google, the popular search engine,1 received a letter 
from the Church of Scientology2 demanding that Google remove several 
links to pages within the Web site www.xenu.net (Xenu) from Google 
search results.3 The Xenu Web site publishes some harsh criticism of 
Scientology,4 but according to the Church of Scientology5 Xenu also 
displayed documents to which Scientology claimed exclusive rights6 under 
copyright law. The Church of Scientology’s argued that posting hyperlinks 
to infringing Web sites was a violation of the Digital Millennium Copyright 
Act of 19987 (DMCA).8 
The Church of Scientology acknowledged that Google was protected 
from liability under the DMCA, but only so long as Google expeditiously 
removed the material in question.9 Google removed the pages from its 
search results, including the Xenu.net home page, even though the home 
                                                                                                                 
 1. The term “search engine” is used here in reference to providers of online search 
technology that index the Internet, such as Google, Yahoo, MSN, AOL or Ask. 
 2. The Church of Scientology is a religious organization founded in the early 1950’s and 
based on the writings of the author L. Ron Hubbard. See Meet L. Ron Hubbard, 
http://www.scientology.org/en_US/l-ron-hubbard/meet/index.html (last visited Oct. 5, 2006). 
References to Scientology are solely for the purpose of illustrating the application of the Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act on the Internet. Any questions regarding Scientology’s religious 
legitimacy are outside the scope of this note. 
 3. Letter from Moxon & Kobrin, Church of Scientology Legal Counsel, to Google, Inc.  
(Mar. 8, 2002) (on file with Google, Inc.), available at http://www.chillingeffects.org/dmca512/ 
notice.cgi?NoticeID=232 [hereinafter Xenu Complaint].  
 4. See Operation Clambake Presents: Frequently Asked Questions, http://xenu.net/cb-
faq.html (last visited Oct. 9, 2006). 
 5. See Xenu Complaint, supra note 3. 
 6. Section 106 of the U.S. Copyright Act grants the owner of a valid copyright exclusive right 
to reproduction, adaptation, distribution, performance, and public display of the underlying work. 
See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (Supp. II 2002). Someone who violates one of those exclusive rights may be 
liable for copyright infringement. See id. § 501(a) (Supp. II 2002). Where copyrighted material is 
published on a website such as Xenu.net without authorization, the copyright owner can claim 
violation of her reproduction and distribution rights. 
 7. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (Oct. 28, 
1998) (codified in diverse sections of 17 U.S.C. §§101 et seq.).  
 8. See Xenu Complaint, supra note 3 (referencing 17 U.S.C. § 512(d) (2000)). 
 9. Id. 
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page did not appear to include any infringing material.10 In a subsequent 
email to Xenu, Google explained that if it had not removed links to the 
allegedly infringing pages, Google would have risked being sued for 
copyright infringement.11 
Scientology’s use of copyright law to secure protection for its materials 
on the Internet has attracted media attention.12 The Church of Scientology 
has adopted a legal strategy of aggressively targeting Web sites that publish 
anti-Scientology materials.13 They have sent cease and desist letters not 
only to the allegedly infringing properties, but also to Internet Service 
Providers that host the pages and to search engines that link to the alleged 
infringers in search results.14 As a result, Web sites that were created to 
criticize the Church of Scientology have had their content removed by 
service providers.15 The Church of Scientology has also targeted online 
community discussion boards with cease and desists.16 
The fact that Google could be sued at all for linking to third party Web 
sites is problematic. It would be unreasonable to hold Google responsible 
for all the content on the Web. Congress attempted to deal with this 
problem by including a “safe harbor” provision in the DMCA, granting 
search engines and other online service providers (OSPs) limited liability 
for copyright infringement by third parties.17 Still, to preserve this limited 
liability OSPs must “take down” infringing material after receiving proper 
notice.18 This seems like a fair solution for the clear cases of unadulterated 
                                                                                                                 
 10. See John Hiler, Church v. Google, MICROCONTENT NEWS, Mar. 21, 2002, 
http://microcontentnews.com/articles/googlechurch.htm. 
 11. Email from Google, Inc. to Xenu.net (Mar. 3, 2002) (on file with Xenu.net), available at 
http://xenu.net/news/20020320-google.txt. 
 12. See Matt Hines, Scientology Loss Keeps Hyperlinks Legal, CNET NEWS, Sept. 8, 2003, 
http://news.com.com/2100-1028_3-5072581.html (“Scientologists have taken a vigorous approach 
to squelching critical Web sites, pressuring site operators, ISPs and even Internet heavyweights 
such as Google into removing links to Web pages.”). 
 13. Id.; see also Hiler, supra note 10. 
 14. See Jonathan I. Edelstein, Note, Anonymity and International Law Enforcement in 
Cyberspace, 7 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 231, 294 n.159 (1996) (“On 
September 5, 1995, the Religious Technology Center and its Dutch attorneys, the law firm of 
Nauta-Dutilh, prevailed upon the Dutch police to raid the offices of XS4ALL, an anonymous 
[email] service over which copyright-protected Scientology material was allegedly being sent.”); 
Matt Loney & Evan Hansen, Google pulls anti-Scientology links, CNET NEWS, Mar. 21, 2002, 
http://news.com.com/2100-1023-865936.html. 
 15. See Declan McCullagh, Google Yanks Anti-Church Sites, WIRED, Mar. 21, 2002, available 
at http://wired.com/news/politics/0,1283,51233,00.html. 
 16. Letter from Moxon & Kobrin, Church of Scientology Legal Counsel, to Google, Inc. (Aug. 
15, 2002), available at, http://chillingeffects.org/dmca512/notice.cgi?NoticeID=388 (requesting 
the removal of content from online discussion boards that, according to Scientology, contained 
copyrighted material). 
 17. The limitations on liability of service providers for copyright infringement are codified in 
section 512 of the U.S. Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2000). 
 18. Id. § 512(c). Section 512(c) contains what are commonly known as the “notice and 
takedown” provisions of the DMCA. These provisions dictate that in order to maintain limited 
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infringement such as downloadable versions of well-known pop music or 
movies. But for the ambiguous cases, the incentive remains for Google to 
quickly remove the allegedly infringing content in order to preserve the safe 
harbor protection. There is a clear and present danger that non-infringing 
material will be removed from search results. 
The Xenu.net case was typical in that there was no judicial 
determination of actual copyright infringement. Rather, Google alone 
carried the responsibility of evaluating the validity of the infringement 
claim. However, the Act does not provide OSPs with standards for 
investigating and responding to takedown letters.19 Google was left to 
balance the apparent validity or invalidity of the Scientologists’ claim 
against Google’s own interest in avoiding a lawsuit. This situation presents 
the OSPs with a Hobson’s choice between: 
a) refusing to remove the information and risking liability for 
    infringement; 
b) conducting costly inquiries into the validity of infringement claims, 
    diverting resources from core business goals; or 
c) removing information from the Internet with minimal investigation.  
In the interest of efficiency, an OSP in this situation may opt to take down 
material first and ask questions later. This suggests that Google and other 
OSPs might comply with even far-fetched infringement notices. Oddly 
enough, one cannot know for sure whether this is happening with any 
frequency. Because there is no official public record of how much material 
has been taken down in response to DMCA notices, by whom, or at whose 
request.20 
This note argues that the lack of transparency in the current notice and 
takedown regime hobbles Internet speech, commerce, and technology by 
perpetuating a lopsided set of incentives for the removal of non-infringing 
material from the Internet. Part II of the note outlines the current Internet 
copyright laws and briefly discusses the shift from ISPs to search engines as 
prime targets for DMCA takedown requests. Part III raises potential 
problems with the current regime including a potential for abuse and a 
chilling effect on speech. Part IV argues that there is no underlying liability 
for Google regardless of DMCA safe harbor. Part V is an economic analysis 
of the current system’s problems for industry, consumers, and government. 
Part VI suggests that the skewed incentives of the current notice and 
takedown scheme could be handled without direct government regulation 
                                                                                                                 
liability a service provider must remove infringing content after receiving notice. For the purposes 
of this note, such removals are referred to as takedowns. 
 19. See generally Emily Zarins, Note, Notice Versus Knowledge Under the Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act’s Safe Harbors, 92 CAL. L. REV. 257 (2004). 
 20. While no public record of takedown requests exists, the Electronic Frontier Foundation 
and a consortium of law school clinics have been assembling a database of these requests at 
http://www.chillingeffects.org. In 2002, Google agreed to forward takedown requests to 
Chillingeffects.org. 
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by standardizing OSP industry practices and creating a complete public 
record of DMCA takedown requests. 
II.  BACKGROUND 
A. GOOGLE: A NEW TARGET 
Search engines have emerged as an ideal target for copyright owners 
trying to find and stop infringement. Early Internet copyright litigation 
focused on Internet service providers (ISPs) (those companies that actually 
hosted the infringing material on their servers).21 But publishers whose web 
sites were taken down by ISPs were able to migrate to new servers and 
reappear online relatively quickly.22 More recent legal disputes have 
focused on search engines. Since the mid 1990’s, search engines have 
become an essential and dominant source for Internet content. Internet users 
are increasingly reliant on search technology for direct and immediate 
access to particularized information.23 Google has emerged as the most 
popular search engine.24 Google’s market hegemony may have helped bring 
about a new strategy for copyright owners: combating small-time copyright 
infringers by affecting removal of infringing content from search engines 
and thus preventing users from finding it.25 Since 2002, Google has 
reported approximately 1000 DMCA take down requests.26 
                                                                                                                 
 21. See ALS Scan, Inc. v. RemarQ Cmtys., Inc. 239 F.3d 619 (4th Cir. 2001); Sega Enterprises 
Ltd. v. Maphia, 857 F. Supp. 679 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (finding an online bulletin board service (BBS) 
operator liable for allowing a user to uploaded copyrighted video games onto the BBS). 
 22. See Xenu Complaint, supra note 3. The Church of Scientology complained, 
“www.xenu.net has been removed five times by well known internet service providers.” This 
indicates, that while the Church of Scientology may have been successful in persuading several 
ISPs to remove the Xenu.net site from their servers, Xenu could still obtain new hosting services. 
 23. While search engines were popular in the early days of the Internet economy, their 
importance has become much greater in recent years. See Brian Morrissey, Search Guiding More 
Web Activity, INTERNET NEWS, Mar. 12, 2003, http://www.internetnews.com/IAR/article.php/ 
2108921 (“[A]long with going directly to Web sites, people are more likely to go to a search 
engine. . . . There’s less meandering around the Web. The Web’s becoming an efficient utility . . . 
The search engines apparently are becoming the card catalog to the Web. . . .”). 
 24. See Google voted best brand of 2003, BBC NEWS, Feb. 3 2004, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/ 
hi/business/3456363.stm (“The company now has more than 70% of the global market, meaning 
that seven out of 10 people will click onto Google’s webpage when they are looking for infor-
mation on the Internet.”). Underscoring Google’s synonymy with Internet search, the verb “to 
google” is established in the lexicon. See Jonathan Duffy, Google calls in the language police, 
BBC NEWS, June 20, 2003, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/3006486.stm (“Singletons will ‘google’ 
a new boyfriend or girlfriend—run their name through a search engine—to check them out. 
People now talk about ‘googling’ and ‘being googled.’”). Ironically, as Duffy points out, Google 
has made efforts to keep the term out of dictionaries in order to maintain control of its trademarks 
and brand identity. 
 25. While the Church of Scientology may have been successful in persuading several ISPs to 
remove the Xenu.net site from their servers, Xenu could still obtain new hosting services. See 
Xenu Complaint, supra note 3 (noting that xenu.net had previously been removed by several 
ISPs). The Church of Scientology may have concluded that the most effective way to prevent 
Internet users from viewing the Xenu site was not just to temporarily remove it from the Internet, 
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B. DIGITAL MILLENNIUM COPYRIGHT ACT 
The DMCA’s two chief sections, the anti-circumvention27 and safe 
harbor provisions,28 seek a balance between the interests of copyright 
holders and the risk of overburdening service providers with the task of 
actively policing networks for infringement.29 While the anti-circumvention 
provisions of the Act seek to prevent frustration of copy protection systems, 
the safe harbor provisions limit liability for certain tools necessary to the 
operation of the Internet such as “information location tools,”30 “passive 
conduits,”31 and “system caching.”32 
The safe harbor protections, however, come with qualifications and 
strings attached. A service provider is only immune from liability if it lacks 
actual knowledge of the infringing behavior,33 and “does not receive a 
financial benefit directly attributable to the infringing activity.”34 But most 
importantly, upon receiving notice of infringement the provider must “act 
expeditiously to remove, or disable access to, the material[.]”35 An OSP is 
not liable to the alleged infringer even if it removes non-infringing material, 
so long as the removal is part of a good faith response to a takedown 
letter.36 Instead, a web site publisher whose content has been removed may 
file a counter-notification with the provider and request that her content be 
“put back.”37 Finally, if either the copyright owner or the alleged infringer 
                                                                                                                 
but rather to prevent users from finding it through Google. Also, since § 512(d) of the DMCA, 
which applies to search engines, does not provide for notice to alleged infringers, Google may be 
an even more convenient target for takedown requests because the complaining party can 
potentially obviate the need for any direct communication with the alleged infringer. 
 26. See Chilling Effects Clearinghouse, http://www.chillingeffects.org/search.cgi (last visited 
Oct. 22, 2006). A search in the Chilling Effects database for cases and desists received by Google 
produces 1481 results. 
 27. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(A) (2000) (“No person shall circumvent a technological 
measure that effectively controls access to a work protected under this title.”). 
 28. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(a)–(e) (2000). 
 29. See Jennifer M. Urban and Laura Quilter, Efficient Process or “Chilling Effects”? 
Takedown Notices Under Section 512 of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 22 SANTA CLARA 
COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 621, 631–33 (2006). 
 30. 17 U.S.C. § 512(d).  
 31. Id. Section 512(a) creates safe harbor for “transitory digital network communications,” 
commonly referred to as “passive conduits.” These include service providers who, for example, 
provide technology to facilitate sending email. 
 32. Id. § 512(b). 
 33. Id. § 512(c)(1)(A). 
 34. Id. § 512(c)(1)(B). 
 35. Id. § 512(c)(1)(A)(iii). 
 36. 17 U.S.C. § 512(g). Under this section, the OSP must make a good faith effort to locate 
and notify the subscriber whose content was taken down. Also, if the subscriber files a counter-
notification contesting the takedown, the OSP must provide the original complainant with a copy 
of the counter-notification and notice that the OSP will replace the material within ten business 
days. Last, the OSP must replace the material within ten to fourteen days after receipt of the 
counter-notification, unless the complainant files a lawsuit seeking injunctive relief against the 
subscriber. 
 37. Id. 
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makes knowing material misrepresentations about the infringing or non-
infringing character of the material, § 512(f) of the Act provides liability for 
damages including costs and attorney’s fees.38 
C. COPYRIGHT LITIGATION AND SECONDARY LIABILITY BEFORE 
AND AFTER THE DMCA. 
Before the DMCA, copyright cases involving the liability of ISPs had 
varying outcomes. In one pre-DMCA case, Playboy Enterprises v. Frena,39 
the district court found that the operator of an Internet bulletin board service 
(BBS) had directly infringed the plaintiff’s distribution rights. The problem 
stemmed from users of the defendant’s service posting digitized images of 
Playboy centerfolds. The court noted that copyright infringement is a strict 
liability offense and found the defendant liable, reasoning that while the 
defendant had acted passively, the system itself had contributed to the 
infringement. This approach, however, was largely abandoned. In Religious 
Technology Center v. Netcom On-Line Communication Services, Inc.40 the 
court refused to find direct infringement without a showing of “some 
element of volition or causation which is lacking where a defendant’s 
system is merely used to create a copy by a third party.”41 
Although Netcom’s “volitional act” test was largely accepted and 
applied,42 it would not equip service providers with an impermeable shield 
from liability.43 Netcom’s standard of application remains murky today. 
After the DMCA became law, one of the first cases to apply it was ALS-
Scan v. RemarQ Communities, Inc.44 In that case, an ISP ignored the 
plaintiff’s requests to remove entire Internet newsgroups where users were 
transmitting pornography despite the plaintiff’s claim to exclusive 
distribution rights.45 Despite the plaintiff’s failure to meet the statutory 
                                                                                                                 
 38. Id. § 512(f). 
 39. Playboy Enters. v. Frena, 839 F. Supp. 1552 (M.D. Fla. 1993). 
 40. Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commc’n Serv., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. 
Cal. 1995). 
 41. Id. at 1370. 
 42. See, e.g., CoStar Group Inc. v. Loopnet, Inc., 373 F.3d 544 (4th Cir. 2004). The court in 
CoStar said: 
There are thousands of owners, contractors, servers, and users involved in the Internet 
whose role involves the storage and transmission of data in the establishment and 
maintenance of an Internet facility. Yet their conduct is not truly “copying” as 
understood by the Act; rather, they are conduits from or to would-be copiers and have 
no interest in the copy itself. 
Id. at 551. 
 43. See Perfect 10, Inc. v. Cybernet Ventures, Inc., 213 F. Supp. 2d 1146, 1173 (C.D. Cal. 
2002) (finding Cybernet liable for vicarious infringement where Cybernet failed to implement a 
policy of terminating users that were repeat infringers). 
 44. ALS-Scan v. RemarQ Cmtys., Inc., 239 F.3d 619 (4th Cir. 2001). 
 45. Id. at 621. 
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requirements in providing notice of the infringement,46 the fourth circuit 
held that the safe harbor provisions of the DMCA did not exempt RemarQ 
from secondary liability.47 The court held that safe harbor did not apply, 
even in the absence of a “volitional act.”48 
Given an OSP’s option of preserving limited liability, Congress might 
have predicted a dearth of litigation over application of the DMCA safe 
harbor provisions. However, Congress may not have anticipated the neglect 
of the § 512(g) “putback” provision and the obsolescence of the § 512(f) 
penalties for misrepresentation. Indeed, both of these provisions are almost 
never used. Preliminary analyses of takedown letters collected by 
Chillingeffects.org have indicated that § 512(g)’s counter-notification 
provisions are rarely used. A survey of the two thousand notifications 
reported to chilling effects since 2002 reveals only seven instances of 
counter-notifications.49 Successful § 512(f) claims for fraudulent misrep-
resentation are also few and far between. While the plaintiffs were 
successful in one such claim in Online Policy Group v. Diebold,50 the courts 
have set a very high standard for showing “knowing misrepresentation,”51 a 
critical element of fraud. As a result, except for the clearly sinister case of 
copyright law manipulation, § 512(f) fails to act as a deterrent against 
spurious takedown requests. 
III. THE SCOPE OF THE PROBLEM 
In the 2003 article, How Liberty Disappeared From Cyberspace,52 the 
authors conducted a “mystery shopper” test.53 They posted public domain54 
excerpts from philosopher John Stuart Mill’s On Liberty on free web site 
hosts from both U.K. and U.S. ISPs. Then, posing as the Chairman of the 
(fictitious) John Stuart Mill Heritage Foundation, they sent cease and desist 
letters to both ISPs claiming copyright violation and demanding that the 
                                                                                                                 
 46. See Raphael A. Gutiérrez, Save The Slip For The Service Providers: Courts Should Not 
Give Short Shrift To The Safe Harbors Of The Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 36 U.S.F. L. 
REV. 907, 934 (2002) (arguing that ALS Scan court misconstrued the statute by accepting ALS 
Scan’s website address as substantial compliance with the statutory notice requirements, rather 
than requiring a representative list of all the allegedly infringed works). 
 47. ALS-Scan, 239 F.3d at 626. 
 48. Id. 
 49. See Urban, supra note 29, at 679. 
 50. Online Policy Group v. Diebold, 337 F. Supp. 2d 1195 (N.D. Cal. 2004). 
 51. See Urban, supra note 29, at 630 (“[F]or a complainant to ‘know’ with legal certainty that 
its complaint targets a non-infringing or fair use is often unrealistic, given the complexity of 
copyright infringement analysis and the famed unpredictability of the fair use defense.” (citing 
Rossi v. Motion Picture Ass’n of America, 391 F.3d 1000 (9th Cir. 2004); Dudnikov v. MGM 
Entm’t., Inc., 410 F. Supp. 2d 1010 (D. Colo. 2005))). 
 52. Christian Ahlert, Chris Marsden and Chester Yung, How Liberty Disappeared From 
Cyberspace (May 2003), available at http://pcmlp.socleg.ox.ac.uk/text/liberty.pdf. 
 53. Id. at 17. 
 54.  “On Liberty” was first published in 1859 and has passed into the public domain under 
U.S. and U.K. law. Id. at 3. 
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pages be taken down.55 The U.S. ISP responded to the complaint by 
requesting that notice of infringement be given in a way that satisfied the 
statutory requirements of the DMCA (including swearing under penalty of 
perjury to the truth of the complaint).56 The U.K. ISP, on the other hand, 
promptly took down the site with minimal investigation.57 
The “mystery shopper” research highlights concerns about the notice 
and takedown regime. First, there is a lack of standards for responding to 
complaints, particularly in the EU.58 Second, service providers have an 
economic motivation to take down materials with minimal investigation.59 
Third, the potential for abuse is high.60 
A. STANDARDS FOR RESPONSE 
The EU’s legislative analog to the DMCA, the European Directive On 
Electronic Commerce (EU Directive),61 states the law in language similar to 
the DMCA. The EU Directive states, “upon obtaining actual knowledge or 
awareness of illegal activities [a provider] has to act expeditiously to 
remove or to disable access to the information concerned.”62 In the 
application of both U.S. and U.K. law, a fundamental question is the 
standard for “actual knowledge or awareness.” Arguably, receipt of a 
complaint does not constitute actual knowledge of illegal activities, but 
merely a notice of the complaint.63 The DMCA sets out specific mechanical 
criteria for proper notice,64 but not for actual knowledge. Neither the EU 
                                                                                                                 
 55. Id. 
 56. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(A)(vi) (2000) (“A statement that the information in the 
notification is accurate, and under penalty of perjury, that the complaining party is authorized to 
act on behalf of the owner of an exclusive right that is allegedly infringed.”). Since the details in 
the complaint were quite false, Ahlert and his colleagues chose not to pursue this complaint 
further with the U.S. ISP. See Ahlert, supra note 52, at 23. 
 57. Ahlert, supra note 52, at 24. 
 58. Id. at  9 .  
 59. Id. at 11 (“It does not create an incentive for the ISP to properly investigate whether 
content is illegal, but rather to remove the content expeditiously.”). 
 60. Id. at 10 (“[T]he current regime may actually promote unfair competition in some 
situations where companies engage in a form of commercial war on the internet, putting bad faith 
claims against their competitor’s Web content.”). 
 61. Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 on 
certain legal aspects of information society services, in particular electronic commerce, in the 
Internal Market, 2000 O.J. (L 178), available at http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/pri/en/oj/dat/ 
2000/l_178/l_17820000717en00010016.pdf. 
 62. Id. 
 63. The DMCA’s language raises the same question of the standard for “actual knowledge.” 
For a discussion of this distinction as applied to the DMCA, see generally Zarins, supra note 19. 
 64. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3) (2000). The statute requires for notice: i) the signature of 
someone authorized to act on behalf of the copyright owner; ii) identification of the copyrighted 
work or works claimed to have been infringed; iii) identification of the materials claimed to be 
infringing, and information sufficient to locate those materials; iv) contact information for the 
complaining party; v) a statement that the complaining party has a good faith belief that use of the 
material is not authorized by the copyright owner, its agent, or the law; and vi) a statement that the 
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Directive nor the DMCA sets a standard for how much proof a complaining 
party must present in a request for removal. In practice, under the EU 
Directive, providers tend to treat the complaint as actual knowledge of 
infringement.65 Indeed, although the mystery shopper test was constructed 
so that even minimal investigation would reveal that the complaint was 
fictitious, the U.K. provider removed the material anyway. Under the 
DMCA, once the minimum notice requirements are met, a provider can 
simply take the complaining party’s word without further investigation, no 
matter how farfetched the claim. Had the “mystery shoppers” been willing 
to falsely swear under penalty of perjury, the U.S. ISP may have been 
willing to take their word for it. 
B. LOW INCENTIVES FOR DUE DILIGENCE 
There are two reasons why a provider might not question takedown 
requests. First, there is the threat of losing safe harbor protections and being 
exposed to liability for failure to remove infringing material after receiving 
notice. Second, thoroughly investigating each of these claims can be 
terribly arduous and expensive. Even in the EU, where there is a threat of 
liability for wrongfully removing legal content,66 the incentive to take down 
content still outweighs the risks of not taking down. Copyright owners are 
more likely to take legal action against a deep-pocketed third party provider 
than against an individual Web site publisher.67 
Reviewing the validity of takedown requests demands significant work 
and legal training. Although some disputed Web pages clearly violate 
copyright laws, most fall in a gray area.68 Further, many disputes involve 
large amounts of material. For example, one complaint submitted to Google 
by Perfect 10, Inc. set forth approximately 200 individual claims of 
                                                                                                                 
information in the notification is accurate, and under penalty of perjury, that the complaining party 
is authorized to act on behalf of the copyright owner. 
 65. See Ahlert, supra note 52, at 9–10. 
 66. In the United States, the DMCA excludes such liability, providing: 
a service provider shall not be liable to any person for any claim based on the service 
provider’s good faith disabling of access to, or removal of, material or activity claiming 
to be infringing or based on facts or circumstances from which infringing activity is 
apparent, regardless of whether the material or activity is ultimately determined to be 
infringed. 
17 U.S.C. § 512(g)(1). 
 67. Individual operators often have no assets, eliminating the deterrent value of large 
judgments. Moreover, Web site operators are often intimidated into removing content without the 
need for litigation. See Lisa M. Bowman, Free Speech Feels Net copyright chill, CNET NEWS, 
Oct 24, 2002, http://news.com.com/2102-1023_3-963122.html?tag=st.util.print (“[L]egitimate 
sites were being shut down by legal threats. People who don’t have legal training or lots of money 
often back down when they receive threatening letters from lawyers.”). 
 68. Id. 
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infringement for unauthorized use of adult content.69 The resources that 
Google would need to devote to parsing through each of the individual 
claims would be significant, even without any legal investigation into actual 
infringement. Verifying the authorship of each work and ascertaining 
whether rights to each have in fact been infringed would be unworkable. 
Congress probably did not intend that a provider such as Google should 
maintain a staff of copyright lawyers and pornography connoisseurs in 
order to respond to such claims. The alternative, however, is that Congress 
meant for providers to take each complaint on its face as actual knowledge 
of infringement. While the investigative measures that Google took in 
response to Perfect 10’s claims are unclear, Google did ultimately remove 
several of the links.70 
It is arguably impossible for a service provider like Google to 
effectively police its search results for infringing content.71 The Church of 
Scientology and others have submitted several complaints to Google not 
only for search results, but also for postings in Google Groups, Google’s 
newsgroup service.72 Service providers have argued that saddling 
technology providers with comprehensive policing duties will hamper 
technology services and dramatically raise costs for consumers.73 
                                                                                                                 
 69. See Letter from Perfect 10 to Google (Aug. 30, 2005), available at http://www.chilling 
effects.org/dmca512/notice.cgi?action=image_2798. 
 70. Perfect 10 complained that a Google search for “Vibe Sorenson” (the model in several of 
the allegedly infringed photographs) brought up search results containing links to infringing web 
sites. Google removed the links to the infringing sites. The same search now reveals several 
messages stating, “In response to a complaint we received under the US Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act, we have removed 2 result(s) from this page. If you wish, you may read the DMCA 
complaint that caused the removal(s) at ChillingEffects.org.” 
 71. See Susan Kuchinskas, A Perfect Storm for Infringement, INTERNETNEWS.COM, Aug. 26, 
2005, http://www.internetnews.com/bus-news/article.php/3530331. 
Google’s point of view, as expressed in an e-mail provided to internetnews.com, was 
that he should take his complaint to the offending publishers. “Google is a provider of 
information, not a mediator. . . . Even if we were able to eliminate the offending page 
from our index, it would still be on the Web. Every few weeks, our robots sweep the 
Web for content. If the site is still available on the Web when we crawl, we will likely 
pick it up and add it to our index again.” 
Id.  
 72. See Letter from Moxon & Kobrin, Church of Scientology Legal Counsel, to Google, Inc. 
(Oct. 29, 2005), available at http://www.chillingeffects.org/dmca512/notice.cgi?NoticeID=2355. 
 73. See Zarins, supra note 19, at 266; see also Cassandra Imfeld and Victoria Smith Ekstrand, 
The Music Industry And The Legislative Development Of The Digital Millennium Copyright Act’s 
Online Service Provider Provision, 10 COMM. L. & POL’Y 291, 305 (2005). 
[Service providers] in performing their various system functions, simply cannot review 
and monitor all the data that is transmitted over and stored in their networks or bulletin 
boards. Indeed, trillions of bits of data—representing millions of individual messages—
travel across the country and around the world each day. . . . Providers of online 
services do not know what is being uploaded onto, transmitted through, stored upon, 
and downloaded from their systems. 
Id. 
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C. POTENTIAL FOR ABUSE 
It is not surprising that many service providers have chosen to cut off 
liability by presuming validity and complying with takedown requests 
rather than struggling to investigate each request.74 As the mystery shopper 
test proves, a party could lodge spurious infringement complaints and 
manage to have content removed. Without a requirement for a judicial 
determination of infringement, the door is open for abuse of the notice and 
takedown system for purposes of interfering with competitors,75 or silencing 
criticism, or just out of arbitrary vindictiveness. 
The absence of a public record of takedown requests raises the potential 
for abuse. Since the public is not generally made aware of takedown 
requests, senders of such requests have far less motivation to behave 
scrupulously than if they were filing a lawsuit, for example. The public will 
never know who sent a typical takedown request, who received it, what 
works have allegedly been infringed or who the alleged infringer was. 
One response to this problem has been the creation of the Chilling 
Effects Clearinghouse (Chillingeffects.org).76 Chillingeffects.org asks its 
users to forward cease and desist letters. Those letters are compiled into a 
searchable database and made available to the public. In 2002 Google 
agreed to forward all the cease and desist letters it received to 
Chillingeffects.org,77 and to post notices wherever it removes content from 
its search results.78 Since Google adopted this policy, Chillingeffects.org 
has published almost a thousand cease and desist letters sent to Google.79 
D. EFFECTS ON SPEECH AND THE UTILITY OF INTERNET SEARCH 
Free speech advocates are concerned that abuse of the notice and 
takedown regime could unjustly chill speech and reduce public access to 
information on the Internet.80 This occurs when non-infringing content is 
                                                                                                                 
 74. See Ahlert, supra note 52, at 6–7. 
 75. See Bowman, supra note 67 (“Free speech advocates also fear that many companies and 
organizations are trying to shoehorn their trademark claims into DMCA claims in the hopes of 
persuading ISPs to quickly take down the sites.”). 
 76. See Chilling Effects, http://www.chillingeffects.org (last visited Nov. 20, 2006).  
 77. See Chris Sherman, Google Makes Scientology Infringement Demand Public, 
SEARCHENGINEWATCH.COM, Apr. 15, 2002, http://searchenginewatch.com/searchday/article.php/ 
2159691 (“Google’s policy is now to send copies of all notices of alleged infringement to third 
parties, such as Chillingeffects.org, that will make them available to the public, confirmed Google 
spokesperson David Krane.”). 
 78. Id. 
 79. In addition to the cease and desist letters that Google has received, ThePlanet.com, an 
Internet hosting provider, has recently agreed to provide Chillingeffects.org with access to the 
1600 requests that it has received since 2004. See Urban, supra note 29, at 643. 
 80. See Tricia Beckles and Marjorie Heins, Commentary: A Preliminary Report on the 
Chilling Effects of “Cease and Desist” Letters (The Free Expression Policy Project, Brennan 
Center for Justice at NYU School of Law, Oct 2004), available at http://www.fepproject.org/ 
commentaries/ceaseanddesist.html. 
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taken down in response to flawed complaints that do not meet the statutory 
requirements of §512. Removing information from search engines also 
makes Internet search technology less useful.81 Google users cannot be sure 
that search results do not exclude important contrasting views. This 
undoubtedly contributed to Google’s decision to forward the takedown 
letters to Chillingeffects.org and to publish notices of removal within search 
results. Google has recognized the value of transparency in the notice and 
takedown process and of avoiding wrongful takedowns.82 However, other 
search engines, like most OSPs, neither forward takedown letters to 
Chillingeffects.org nor publish notices of takedown. 
Wrongful removal of material from Google search results upsets the 
balance of information more than it affects the volume of available 
information. The number of previous DMCA takedowns is probably small 
relative to the billions of pages on the Internet today.83 But with the 
potential for wrongful takedowns of controversial information, users of 
search engines cannot be sure that search results include all available 
contrasting views—that search results were not manipulated to obscure 
detractors or competitors from view. Thus, the removal of controversial 
material strikes a blow to Internet speech, undermining the Internet’s 
capacity to act as a forum for the free exchange of ideas.84 
IV. GOOGLE COULD IGNORE TAKEDOWN REQUESTS 
Google could ignore takedown requests for three reasons. First, Google 
could ignore complaints that do not satisfy the notice requirements of 
§512(c)(3).85 Surprisingly, one out of every eleven notices sent to Google 
exhibited significant statutory flaws.86 Many of the cease and desist letters 
sent to Google exhibited one or more common statutory flaws.87 For 
example, many complaints were invalid because they involved non-
copyrightable materials88 and fair use.89 Other flawed complaints do not 
                                                                                                                 
 81. Legislative history indicates that Congress not only recognized the usefulness of search 
engines when it enacted the DMCA, it acted in order to preserve this utility. See H.R. REP. NO. 
105-551, pt.2, at 58 (1998) (“Information location tools are essential to the operation of the 
Internet; without them, users would not be able to find the information they need.”). 
 82. See Sherman, supra note 77. 
 83. See Hiler, supra note 10. 
 84. See Zeran v. America Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 1997) (“Congress 
recognized the Internet and interactive computer services as offering ‘a forum for a true diversity 
of political discourse, unique opportunities for cultural development, and myriad avenues for 
intellectual activity.’” (quoting Congressional findings in the Communications Decency Act of 
1998, 47 U.S.C. § 230(a)(3) (2000))). 
 85. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3) (2000). 
 86. See Urban, supra note 29, at 674. This one-out-of-eleven figure does not include those 
minor flaws that would not render a complaint invalid such as stating a good faith basis and 
providing a signature. 
 87. Id. at 667. See id. at 666 for a list of these flaws and an analysis of their frequency. 
 88. Section 102 of the U.S. Copyright Act affords protection for “original works of 
authorship.” 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2000). Therefore, a complaint could be ignored where it regarded 
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comply with the technical requirements of § 512(c)(3).90 Another common 
flaw involves § 512(a) takedown letters sent to an OSP acting as a passive 
conduit, such as an upstream provider used for sending email. Unlike BBSs 
and information location tools such as Google, passive conduits are not 
obligated to takedown content under the provisions of §512(c). In nearly 
half of the non-Google notices collected by Chillingeffects.org, the OSPs 
were acting as conduits, and were not obligated to take down content. 
Moreover, they could have ignored those complaints without any loss of 
safe harbor.91 
The second reason Google might ignore takedown notices is that 
Google would not be liable even if it were sued. The DMCA does not alter 
the infringement analysis. It only seeks to foster a system that deals 
efficiently with disputes over Internet property rights. Therefore, a provider 
may waive its safe harbor protections without necessarily becoming liable. 
Where safe harbor does not apply, the infringement analysis remains and a 
court would analyze the facts accordingly.92 It is not surprising that Google 
and other providers choose to keep their own liability limited by following 
notice and takedown procedure. But ignoring certain requests would 
probably not result in liability. This means little in practice because 
businesses generally prefer “no-risk” to “low-risk” and so choose to 
preserve their safe harbor privilege. 
                                                                                                                 
un-authorized use of an idea alone, or something similarly undeserving of protection under 
copyright law. 
 89. Some unauthorized uses of copyrighted materials for “purposes such as criticism, 
comment, news reporting, teaching, . . . scholarship, or research” constitute fair use and are 
therefore non-infringing. Id. § 107 (2000). 
 90. Where a party substantially complies with § 512(c)(3)(A)(ii), (iii) and (iv) (identification 
of the allegedly infringed and infringing works, and contact information for the complaining 
party), but fails to satisfy the other notice requirements of § 512(c)(3)(A), the OSP is not free to 
ignore the request. Instead, the OSP is still obligated to take reasonable steps to assist in receipt of 
notice that substantially complies. Id. § 512(c)(3)(B)(ii). This implies, however, that where the 
complaining party does not: a) identify the allegedly-infringed work; b) identify the allegedly-
infringing work; c) provide a way to locate the allegedly infringing work; and d) provide contact 
information for the complaining party, the OSP would be free to ignore the complaint altogether. 
See Urban, supra note 29, at 674 (defining these subsections as necessary for “substantial 
compliance,” and arguing that any failure to meet them is a “significant” statutory flaw rending 
the notice invalid). 
 91. See Urban, supra note 29, at 674–76. 
 92. Id. at 674. The legislative history for § 512 states: 
The Committee emphasizes that new Section 512 does not specifically mandate use of a 
notice and take-down procedure…[T]he service provider is free to refuse to “take 
down” the material or site-even after receiving a notification of claimed infringement 
from the copyright owner. In such a situation, the service provider’s liability, if any, 
will be decided without reference to new Section 512(c). 
H.R. REP. NO. 105-551, pt. 2, at *58 (1998); See also Ellison v. Robertson, 357 F.3d 1072, 1077 
(9th Cir. 2004) (“Congress provided that OCILLA’s ‘limitations of liability apply if the provider 
is found to be liable under existing principles of law.’”). 
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Very few cases in the United States have found liability for creating 
hyperlinks to infringing content. Two cases that did were Universal City 
Studios v. Reimerdes,93 and Intellectual Reserve v. Utah Lighthouse 
Ministry.94 In both of these cases, the court found that the defendant had 
acted with the purpose of disseminating infringing material.95 In a case 
about hyperlinks in search results, a court would probably not see Google’s 
purpose as the dissemination of infringing material. Since Google’s 
technology automatically sifts vast amounts of Internet content (ostensibly 
the entire Internet) for the purpose of creating a searchable index of that 
content, a court may be unwilling to define Google’s purpose as 
“disseminating” material at all.96 Indeed, Google’s stated mission is “to 
organize the world’s information and make it universally accessible and 
useful.”97 If a court accepted this as Google’s purpose, the court could 
distinguish cases like Reimerdes or Utah Lighthouse Ministry where the 
defendants’ purposes were clear and illicit in comparison.98 
A third reason why Google could decline to take down involves 
complaints under foreign law. Several cease and desist letters in the 
ChillingEffects.org database pertain to European defamation law.99 In the 
                                                                                                                 
 93. Universal City Studios v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). In Reimerdes, 
eight major motion picture studios sued the publisher of 2600: The Hacker Quarterly, an online 
magazine, after the defendant published code which allowed users to ‘rip’ and copy encoded 
DVDs. Id. at 308. 
 94. Intellectual Reserve v. Utah Lighthouse Ministry, 75 F. Supp. 2d 1290 (D. Utah 1999). In 
Utah Lighthouse, defendants were held liable for linking to three websites where users could 
download plaintiff’s copyrighted material. Finding contributory liability, the court found that the 
defendants contributed not to the infringing behavior of the websites offering the material for 
download, but rather for the actual downloading by the users. Id. at 1295. 
 95. In Reimerdes, the defendant was found contributorily liable under the DMCA’s 
anticircumvention provisions. After being enjoined from posting the code on his own website, 
defendant urged other sites who had not been enjoined to post the material and then linked to 
those sites for the purpose of facilitating downloads. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 324. Similarly, 
in Utah Lighthouse Ministry, the court emphasized: “After being ordered to remove the Handbook 
from their website, defendants posted on their website: ‘Church Handbook of Instructions is back 
online!’ and listed the three website addresses.” Utah Lighthouse Ministry, 75 F. Supp. 2d at 1295. 
 96. See Kuchinskas, supra note 71 (quoting an e-mail from Google).  
“Even if we were able to eliminate the offending page from our index, it would still be 
on the Web. Every few weeks, our robots sweep the Web for content. If the site is still 
available on the Web when we crawl, we will likely pick it up and add it to our index 
again.” 
Id.  
 97. Google Corporate Information: Company Overview, http://www.google.com/corporate/ 
(last visited Nov. 13, 2006). 
 98. In both Reimerdes and Utah Lighthouse the defendants were facilitating the illegal copying 
or downloading of copyrighted material. Google, on the other hand, operates a search engine. 
 99. See, e.g., Notice from Google to Chillingeffects.org, German Complaint of Illegal Material 
in Google Search (Sept. 24, 2006), http://chillingeffects.org/international/notice.cgi?NoticeID 
=2382 (“On September 24, 2005, Google received a complaint via email regarding a site that is 
allegedly illegal according to German law. In response to this complaint, we have removed the site 
from the www.google.de domain.”). Among the cease and desist letters that Google has reported 
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United States, ISPs are shielded from defamation claims by the § 230 of 
Communications Decency Act.100 Therefore, DMCA Safe harbor protection 
is irrelevant to foreign defamation claims.101 This is not to say that Google 
could not be sued in a European court under European defamation law. 
However, foreign parties can masquerade foreign law claims as DMCA 
complaints to obtain the quick results that are common in the DMCA notice 
and takedown regime.  
Finally, international takedown requests involving foreign law could 
lead to actions in non-U.S. courts under non-U.S. defamation law. 
However, in such cases a foreign court might lack personal jurisdiction over 
Google. Even if a non-U.S. court exercised jurisdiction, the First 
Amendment might render a foreign judgment unenforceable in the United 
States.102 Google may be subject to jurisdiction in several countries because 
of its international business contacts. Nevertheless, if Google had no assets 
in the foreign jurisdiction, the judgment might be unenforceable in the U.S. 
and Google could choose to ignore the complaint.  
V. AN ECONOMIC APPROACH TO THE CHILLING EFFECT 
A. MARKET FAILURE 
Although elements of the law of secondary liability on the Internet 
remain unsettled, the safe harbor provisions of the DMCA and of the EU 
Directive on Electronic Commerce seem to have helped create a stable 
system of self-regulation in the day-to-day operation of Internet business. In 
the absence of a corpus of case law, an economic analysis of the current 
system of incentives may provide insight into the problems with the notice 
and takedown system, and into the usefulness of available alternatives. 
These problems are externalities (costs or benefits to people other than the 
individuals making decisions) produced by the DMCA’s system of self-
regulation. They can be seen as a form of market failure. 
Failure in the market’s self-regulatory mechanisms include: 
“[m]onopoly, pollution, fraud, mistake, mismanagement, and other unhappy 
                                                                                                                 
to Chillingeffects, there are several other examples of international requests that are specific to 
foreign law. See Chilling Effects Clearinghouse, Int’l Cease and Desist Notices, 
http://chillingeffects.org/international/search.cgi (last visited Nov. 13, 2006). 
 100. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c) (2000); see, e.g., Zeran v. America Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 
1997) (declining to hold ISP liable for failure to remove defamatory material from BBSs).  
 101. See Symposium, Metamorphosis of Artists’ Rights in the Digital Age, 28 COLUM. J.L. & 
ARTS 397, 412 (2005) (“Where no copyright subsists, the protections in the DMCA do not 
apply.”). 
 102. See Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et L’Antisemitisme, 169 F. Supp. 2d 
1181, 1184 (N.D. Cal. 2001). After plaintiffs obtained an order from a French court requiring 
Yahoo! to block French citizens’ access to any Nazi material displayed or offered for sale on 
Yahoo’s United States auction site, Yahoo! filed suit in U.S. district court arguing that 
enforcement of the order would constitute a deprivation of its First Amendment rights. See id. 
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byproducts of the market.”103 In the conventional view, any of these failures 
would justify public regulation.104 While the current system of self-
regulation appears to protect copyrights reasonably well, those protections 
have a social cost in the potential for wrongful removal of information from 
the Internet. Market incentives exacerbate the problem. Offering insulation 
from liability encourages removal of content. The incentive for unjustified 
takedowns, combined with a lack of transparency in the takedown process 
results in a chilling effect on Internet speech. This reduces public access to 
information on the Internet and limits free discourse on the Web. 
Two common methods of regulation used to remedy market failure are 
the common law method and direct (or administrative) regulation.105 The 
common law method relies chiefly on private parties as opposed to public 
officials.106 Private parties can sue those causing the harm and receive 
compensation for the injuries suffered. In addition, the threat of a costly 
lawsuit may deter further harm. In contrast, direct regulation relies more on 
public officials and seeks to prevent injuries before they occur rather than to 
compensate injured parties.107 
A classic illustration of market failure is air pollution.108 The common 
law method will probably not solve problems such as pollution from cars 
because each individual injury is small and the sum of the injuries is spread 
thinly across many parties (both injured and injuring).109 As a result, the 
victims are unlikely to bring lawsuits because their recoverable damages 
will be small in each instance. This problem is analogous to the notice and 
takedown regime’s chilling effect. Single incidents of wrongful removal go 
unreported110 and are not noticed by the public.111 In both contexts, while 
the individual harm is small, the total number of occurrences can multiply 
to yield a very high aggregate social cost. 
                                                                                                                 
 103. RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 383 (6th ed. 2003). 
 104. Id. Posner goes on to qualify this statement, noting that these indications of market failure 
do not necessarily warrant public regulation, and that direct regulation can be costly financially 
and politically. See id. at 385. 
 105. Id. at 383. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. 
 108. See Douglass Kendall & Eric Sorkin, Nothing For Free: How Private Judicial Seminars 
Are Undermining Environmental Protections And Breaking The Public’s Trust, 25 HARV. ENVTL. 
L. REV. 405, 425 (2001). 
 109. See id. at 429 (“Environmentalists also argue that common law liability rules, such as 
nuisance law, are incapable of enforcing the polluter pays principle.”). 
 110. See BERKMAN CTR. FOR INTERNET AND SOCIETY & GARTNERG2, COPYRIGHT AND 
DIGITAL MEDIA IN A POST-NAPSTER WORLD 28 (2003), http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/home/ 
uploads/254/2003-05.pdf. 
 111. Just as one is unlikely to immediately perceive the polluting effect of a single car driving 
by, the public may not notice the removal of a single web site from Google search results. 
However, just as the aggregate effect of millions of cars is apparent, the effects of many 
takedowns would have a noticeable effect on the availability of information. 
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There are three administrative approaches to regulating pollution: input 
control, output control, and tax control.112 With input control, the legislature 
sets mandatory remedial steps that polluters must take to avoid penalties.113 
Output control focuses on ends rather than means, leaving the choice of 
means up to the regulated party while setting a maximum amount of 
pollution that will be allowed without punishment.114 The third approach is 
to tax pollution—setting a “price” for pollution equal to the social cost of 
the pollution.115 These three approaches represent different philosophies for 
correcting market failure, with varying levels of emphasis on self-
regulation, market incentives and economic efficiency. 
Output control and tax control approaches to the notice and takedown 
problem are impracticable. Unlike pollution, the notice and takedown 
externalities are inherently unquantifiable. No public record documents 
DMCA complaints. As a result, no government agency can measure the 
problem to cap or tax it. For air pollution both output control and the tax 
control treat some underlying harm as a “necessary evil.” Even if some air 
pollution is necessary to even the most environmentally friendly 
manufacturing process, wrongful takedowns are not needed for efficient 
operation of the Internet. The “necessary evil” view embodied in the tax 
approach does not translate to the problem at hand. 
B. HAS SELF-REGULATION FAILED OUTRIGHT? 
Discussing this problem in terms of market failure requires working 
around the subjectivity of the notion of “failure.” Common signals of 
market failure (e.g., monopoly, pollution, and fraud) are not necessarily 
litmus tests for a failure of public regulation. Instead, they may indicate 
merely that the market is “failing” only in the sense that “it is failing to be 
perfect.”116 Indeed, the presence of negative externalities may be 
                                                                                                                 
 112. POSNER, supra note 103, at 390–91. 
 113. For example, a polluter might be required to install special sewage treatment plants, 
emission control devices or taller smokestacks. Id. at 390. 
 114. A municipality might set a maximum number of pounds per square inch of pollution, 
leaving the polluter to decide whether it will install new equipment, alter its method of production 
or cease a particularly costly behavior. Posner points out that output control might appear more 
flexible and efficient than input control, but it also creates an incentive to reduce the costs of 
compliance as much as possible, which could allow too much pollution. Id. at 391. 
 115. Id. The tax approach represents a departure in the comparison of pollution and Internet 
self-regulation. The tax approach assumes that a certain level of pollution is not only inevitable 
but necessary and desirable for efficient operation. The tax acts not as a punishment, but as a cost 
of doing business, and an incentive to minimize pollution. Unjustified removal of Internet content 
on the other hand, is not integral to the successful operation of an OSP, but rather is a by product 
of a statutory scheme that creates too great of an incentive for complying with takedown 
complaints. Nevertheless, the pollution analogy helps illustrate the parallel between the topic at 
hand and more traditional examples of market failure. 
 116. NEIL KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN LAW, 
ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 103–04 (1994) (“Since all alternatives are also imperfect, the 
existence of market ‘failures’ cannot determine policy outcomes.”). 
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unfortunate, but the alternatives may well present bigger, more harmful 
externalities.117 
The alternatives for regulation of OSPs with regard to copyright 
infringement may not have proven any better for any of the parties 
concerned. One such alternative was embodied by the proposed measures in 
the White Paper, circulated by the Working Group on Intellectual Property 
Rights September of 1995.118 The White Paper which had been heavily 
influenced by the music and film industries,119 recommended that service 
providers be held strictly liable for user copyright infringement. The effect 
of these changes would have greatly exaggerated the current problems with 
notice and takedown.120 
On the other hand, limiting incentive for service providers to respond to 
the takedown requests presents a different set of problems. The production 
of copyrighted media like music, TV, and film, plays a huge role in the U.S. 
economy.121 Failure to protect the exclusive rights of copyright owners 
would undermine the basic incentives for creation of works under copyright 
law and would place the country’s economic interest at risk. 
From Google’s perspective, continuing to self-regulate under the 
current DMCA regime presents some annoyances, but also offers a degree 
of security. Fielding complaints such as Perfect 10’s122 (i.e. comparing 
hundreds of allegedly infringing pornographic photographs to the originals) 
may be an inefficient use of any technology company’s resources. 
Moreover, removing anything from search results arguably runs counter to 
                                                                                                                 
 117. For example, both Posner and Komesar point out that regulation involves serious 
information problems. POSNER, supra note 103, at 385 (“If accident victims have nothing to gain 
from bringing an unsafe condition to the government’s attention, the regulators may have 
difficulty finding out what exactly the problem is.”). Komesar also suggests that high costs of 
information (cost of acquiring basic data, as well as the costs of understanding that data) as a 
potential root cause of market failure. See KOMESAR, supra note 116, at 102–03 (“Where low per 
capita transaction benefits combine with high information costs, we get ignorance that can be 
manifested in a failure to act or in a mistaken choice that would not be made given better 
information.”). 
 118. Information Infrastructure Task Force Working Group on Intellectual Property Rights, 
Intellectual Property Rights and the National Information Infrastructure (Sept. 1995), available at 
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/doc/ipnii/ipnii.pdf [hereinafter White Paper]. 
 119. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE 126 (2004) (referring to “copyright warriors”). 
 120. See Zarins, supra note 19, at 266.  
The effect of the White Paper’s proposed changes would be not only to further the 
interests of powerful copyright holders, but also to call upon service providers to play 
the role of digital copyright cops. That is, faced with liability for direct infringement 
regardless of knowledge, a service provider could either close up shop or feverishly try 
to monitor all content flowing through its infrastructure . . . . 
Id.  
 121. See INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ALLIANCE, COPYRIGHT INDUSTRIES IN 
THE U.S. ECONOMY, THE 2004 REPORT, http://www.iipa.com/pdf/2004_SIWEK_FULL.pdf. In 
2002 the value added by the copyright industry to the U.S. economy was $626 billion or six 
percent of the U.S. economy. Id. 
 122. See Letter from Perfect 10 to Google, supra note 69. 
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a search engine’s function of providing search technology that indexes all 
available information. On the other hand, a constant need to actively police 
content for copyright violations by users would have a crippling effect on 
OSPs and the technology that they create.123 Additionally, direct regulation 
by an administrative agency would present a whole new set of transaction 
costs from Google’s perspective. Google would probably prefer to continue 
to self-regulate. Most importantly, the limitation on liability that Google 
enjoys under the safe harbor provisions allows it to properly allocate 
resources for responding to takedown requests without too much concern 
over being sued for infringement.124 
Copyright owners are possibly the most content under the current 
system. Though a strict liability system like that proposed in the White 
Paper would have provided for aggressive protection of copyrights,125 the 
notice and takedown regime also provides for very strong protection. It is 
possible that the copyright industry is really in a comparable position to 
what might have occurred under a White Paper system, given evidence of 
over-enforcement in responses to takedown requests. 
From the government perspective too, self-regulation is less costly than 
a more direct method of administrative regulation. The status quo appears 
to function properly in terms of the DMCA’s principal concern—regulating 
copyright infringement. The government would probably not be eager to 
adopt a more invasive system of regulation, particularly since the associated 
transaction costs could hinder OSPs in their development of technology. In 
light of the alternatives, it is possible that the notice and takedown problem 
does not constitute the level of market failure that would require a new 
system of public regulation. However, this is not to say that Internet users, 
publishers or OSPs should be content with the notice and takedown regime 
as it exists today. 
VI. CONCLUSION AND PROPOSED REMEDIAL MEASURES 
Despite its lack of clear standards in terms of the proper response to a § 
512 complaint, the DMCA has achieved some success in balancing its two 
principal goals: protection of the rights of copyright owners and limiting 
liability of online service providers. However, an examination of the 
application of the DMCA’s notice and takedown process reveals negative 
externalities. Byproducts of the notice and takedown regime include an 
incentive for OSPs to remove content without careful scrutiny. This 
                                                                                                                 
 123. See Zarins, supra note 19, at 266 (“[An OSP’s] ability to monitor the ‘trillions of bits of 
data—representing millions of individual messages’ that travel through their systems every day is 
virtually impossible without considerably slowing down the hailed ‘Internet speed’ or burdening 
consumers with dramatically increased costs.”). 
 124. Of course, Google is not immune from being sued. See Perfect 10 v. Google, 416 F. Supp. 
2d 828 (C.D. Cal. 2006). 
 125. See White Paper, supra note 118, at 114–24. 
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incentive increases the potential that flawed or disingenuous complaints 
will still result in the removal of content from the Internet.126 Indeed, flawed 
complaints are common.127 The potential for abuse of the notice and 
takedown system may not rise to the level of market failure requiring the 
introduction of direct government regulation. However, consumers, 
providers and the government need not and should not be content with the 
current system’s externalities. Steps should still be taken to balance the 
incentives and minimize the potential for wrongful takedowns. 
A. INTERNATIONAL STANDARDIZATION OF INDUSTRY BEST 
PRACTICES 
One measure for minimizing the problems of notice and takedown 
without the need for administrative regulation is the development of 
international standards of industry best practices for online service 
providers. Since judicial determination of infringement is not part of the 
notice and takedown process, OSPs act as de facto judges and juries, 
ultimately deciding the validity of complaints. Since the DMCA does not 
provide guidelines for OSPs, creating a workable standard for evaluation of 
complaints would contribute to uniform results and reduce the appearance 
of arbitrariness. Such standards would also act as self-imposed measures 
against unwarranted takedowns. This could include following Google’s lead 
by forwarding DMCA complaints to the Chillingeffects.org database, as 
well as a heightened level of scrutiny for the types of complaints that are 
likely to be questionable, such as complaints about content that is published 
for the purpose of criticism of the complaining party, or by business 
competitors.128 
B. DEVELOPMENT OF A PUBLIC RECORD 
In light of the potential for fraud, abuse and mistakes, the need for 
greater transparency in the notice and takedown process is evident. Despite 
the public interest in making (and keeping) information available on the 
Internet, there is no effective way for the public to monitor the takedown 
process. Complaining parties have had little reason to expect that their 
complaints would be subject to significant scrutiny. Indeed, the service 
providers that receive complaints are not adversaries to the complaining 
copyright owners, but merely intermediaries with an interest in preserving 
their limited liability. 
                                                                                                                 
 126. See Ahlert, supra note 52. 
 127. See Urban, supra note 29, at 674. 
 128. This is not to say that all complaints in these categories are ill-founded. On the contrary, 
most DMCA complaints about copyright infringement are genuine and may indeed warrant a 
takedown. However, the categories of complaints that are most likely to include false complaints 
deserve closer scrutiny. 
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Chillingeffects.org has taken the first steps toward the creation of a 
searchable database of § 512 takedown requests. However, since this 
database only contains complaints that have been voluntarily submitted, the 
scope of the data is limited. To give the public a greater opportunity to 
monitor removal of information from the Internet it is necessary to expand 
the pool of available data. One solution would be for the Copyright Act to 
provide a central mechanism for simultaneously sending and recording 
§ 512 complaints. This would not require the government to act as an 
intermediary in the resolution of the complaints. It could merely require 
complaining parties to enter the pertinent information into an online form 
and submit it via the Internet to the intended recipient. In the process, all 
complaints could automatically be recorded in a public database. 
This mechanism would allow for a complete public record of all § 512 
takedown requests. Second, requiring submission of DMCA complaints 
through a public channel would add formality to the process. This could 
deter unfounded or fraudulent complaints by adding additional gravity to 
the § 512(c) requirement of swearing under penalty of perjury to the vera-
city of a complaint. Making these complaints available to the public would 
also check service providers’ incentive to remove content too quickly by 
encouraging greater care in evaluating DMCA complaints. In addition, a 
complete public record could enhance copyright owners’ ability to observe 
patterns of infringement on the Internet and adopt informed policies for the 
protection of their rights. Finally, a public record of takedown complaints 
could also act as a deterrent for infringers. 
The Xenu story underscores the need for increased transparency in the 
takedown process to curb abuse. In a recent article about Google, a 
Norwegian newspaper retold the story of Xenu.net and its operator, 
Andreas Heldal-Lund: 
“[T]he removal of Heldal-Lund’s site from Google did not pass 
unnoticed… American newspapers started writing about Scientology’s 
and Google’s censorship of the Norwegian website… ‘Google reopened 
almost all of my pages, says Heldal-Lund. At the same time the company 
also published all complaints from the Church of Scientology. My case 
was solved, but only because the world media helped. A small 
organization who gets no public attention will get run over. Google might 
have censored more web sites without us knowing. We need a watchdog 
to defend freedom of speech on the Internet,’ says Andreas Heldal-
Lund.”129 
                                                                                                                 
 129. OC News 2005, Xenu.net, http://www.xenu.net/news/oc-news2005.html (Heldal-Lund’s 
English translation of excerpts from an article in the Norwegian paper, DAGENS NAERINGSLIV, 
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Heldal-Lund’s experience demonstrates the benefit of holding parties 
who seek swift justice under the DMCA accountable. Accountability is 
facilitated by moving the notice and takedown process out from behind the 
closed doors, and into public view with defined standards. 
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